Posted in Cyber Law, Law of Evidence

Admissibility of Electronic Evidence – Part III (Post-Anvar situation & development of jurisprudence)

This post constitutes the third and final part of a three-post-series blog post dealing with the courtroom trend with respect to the development of jurisprudence with regard to the admissibility of electronic evidence.

The first part dealt with the background and the problems with the admissibility of the electronic evidence where the author has given an account of the manifestation of the provision in brevity. The second part dealt with the initial development of the jurisprudence on the admissibility of electronic evidence and pre-Anvar P.V. status. This post (the third part) deals with the post-Anvar P.V. status of the provision and the current scenario and conclusion of the series.

Ankur Chawla v. CBI[1], was the case where the High Court of Delhi decided upon the admissibility of audio and video clips in the form of a compact disc for this particular case and stated that it is inadmissible. The trial court admitted the electronic evidence in this case in an erroneous manner. In another case of Jagdeo Singh v. State[2], the court rejected the electronic evidence which was a compact disc, having the data of an intercepted phone call records, because they were not produced along with the certificate which is required by virtue of section 65B. In Sanjaysinh Ramrao v. D. G. Phalke[3], the court upheld the decision of the apex court in the case of Anvar P.V.v. P.K.Basheer[4], and said that since the recorder was not verified, therefore, the transcription and the translation of the recorded voice cannot be admitted as evidence. It pressed upon the question of the authenticity of the source.

In Anvar P.V.[5], the court acknowledged the addition of the special provision to the Act by way of an amendment, after the framing of the IT Act. This case is known for changing the plots in the courtroom, and is a landmark case, as in this judgment by a three-judge-bench, the court discussed about the reliability of secondary data and decided that the secondary data (all the electronic evidences) cannot be treated as admissible evidence unless they are accompanied by the certificate of which section 65B talks about. The certificate ascertains the authenticity of the evidence here. Thus, The case is known for its attempt in setting up the threshold for the admissibility of electronic evidence under section 65B of the Act.

The court also made a distinction in this case, by putting forth its reasoning for the treatment of CD as primary evidence and the recordings as secondary evidence. The court while making a distinction said that since the recordings are made using other electronic devices, therefore they have to be categorized under the head of secondary evidence, whereas, the compact discs are solely used in their very form and hence could be considered as a primary evidence. Later, the Rajasthan High Court adhering to the aforementioned distinction ruled that the recording done on a camera having an HDD can be considered as primary evidence and thus the applicability of section 65B will not be followed in this situation.[6] Therefore, it is imperative to make a distinction between the primary evidence and the secondary evidence in every case as this delineates the requirement of certificate and the provision under which the evidence can be admitted.

The court in the aforementioned case did bring the clarity regarding the electronic evidence and the need of certificate while adducing it, but it did not make it clear as to when are the certificates required precisely. Considering the procedural aspect of the Act, it is the basic rule that the courts cannot deny justice for any flaw in the adherence to the procedures. The whole idea of procedural law is to ease out the process of attainment of justice. The courts, in the cases, such as Paras Jain v. State of Rajasthan[7], and Kundan Singh v. State[8], have also pronounced the same. In both the cases, the Rajasthan High Court, and the Delhi High Court, respectively, said that, the certificate required for the admissibility of the secondary evidence in the form of electronic evidence could be provided at the later stage of trial initiation, post the charge sheet is filed, and this will not dilute its gravity and value.

23. When legal position is that additional evidence, oral or documentary, can be produced during the course of trial if in the opinion of the Court production of it is essential for the proper disposal of the case, how it can be held that the certificate as required under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act cannot be produced subsequently in any circumstances if the same was not procured alongwith the electronic record and not produced in the Court with the charge-sheet. In my opinion it is only an irregularity not going to the root of the matter and is curable. It is also pertinent to note that certificate was produced alongwith the charge-sheet but it was not in a proper form but during the course of hearing of these petitioners, it has been produced on the prescribed form.[9]

40. The computer output – when provisions of section 65-B are satisfied is treated as evidence of the contents of the original or facts therein of which direct evidence is admissible. The secondary evidence in the form of a paper print out or media output produced by copying, recording or storing files is treated as a document and are admissible and bear the same status as “direct evidence” on the question of admissibility. The provision, therefore, negates and does not require production of the original computer/equipment/media, on which the data was stored and from which computer output be it in the form of printed paper or optical or magnetic media data has been obtained. The expression “direct evidence” as strictly understood in the Evidence Act, has been explained below.

  1. Paragraph 21 quoted above records and notices that in State (NCT of Delhi)v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afzal Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600, a responsible officer had certified the document at the time of production itself and the signatures in the certificate were also identified and, therefore, there was compliance of Section 65B of the Evidence Act. In these circumstances, we do not accept the legal ratio in Ankur Chawla v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (Crl. M.C. No. 2455/12 & Crl. M.A. Nos. 8308 and 8318/2014 and Crl. Rev. P. 385/2012 decided on 20th November, 2014 by the Delhi High Court) wherein it has been held that the certificate under Section 65B must be issued when the computer output was formally filed in the court and certificate under Section 65B cannot be produced when the evidence in form of electronic record is tendered in the court as evidence to be marked as an exhibit. The said certificate can be produced when the electronic record is to be admitted and taken on record, i.e., when the prosecution, defence or a party to the civil litigation wants the electronic record to be marked as an exhibit and read in evidence. As far back as 1931, the Lahore High Court in Baldeo Sahai v. Ram Chander, AIR 1931 Lahore 546 had stated:-

“There are two stages relating to documents. One is the stage when all the documents on which the parties rely are filed by them in Court. The next stage is when the documents proved and formally tendered in evidence. It is at this later stage that the Court has to decide whether they should be admitted or rejected. If they are admitted and proved then the seal of the Court is put on them giving certain details laid down by law, otherwise the documents are resumed to the party who produced them with an endorsement thereon to that effect.”[10]

Essentially, the judgment in the Anvar P.V.[11], actually shed light upon the correct procedure of law and the manner in which the electronic evidence can be adduced. The importance of the certificate was made paramount, and courts around the country, heavily relied upon the rationale of this case. For instance, Bala Shaheb Gurling Todkari v. State of Maharashtra[12], Ankur Chawla[13], and D.G.Phalke[14], are few of the cases which relied their decisions upon the aforementioned Supreme Court judgment.

There have also been a plethora of cases where the Supreme Court itself along with the High Courts resorted to an alternate view regarding the admissibility of secondary evidence in form of electronic evidence. For instance, in the case of Thomas Bruno v. State of U.P.[15], the apex court cited the judgment given in the Navjot Sandhu[16] case, regarding the admissibility of electronic evidence. Though the court did not go against the ruling and the basic principle and rationale which the Anvar P.V.[17] case spawned.

The most recent view of the apex court on the debate surrounding the admissibility of the electronic evidence has relied upon the Anvar[18], judgment where the two-judge-bench of A.K.Goel J. and U.U.Lalit J., decided and said that, if a party is not in possession of the device responsible for the procurement of the information, then it is obvious that he will not be able to produce the required certificate, and hence, this cannot come in way of dissemination and impartation of justice. The decision was given considering the fact that the requirement of the certificate is only a procedural need and this cannot and should not be acting as a threat to justice delivery.

29. The applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act of furnishing certificate is to be applied only when such electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in a position to produce such certificate being in control of the said device and not of the opposite party. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said sections can certainly be invoked. If this is not so permitted, it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in the absence of certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65-B(4) is not always mandatory[19]

This judgment seems per incuriam though, considering two factors essentially. One, the judgment being in contravention to the rationale which was provided in the relying case which necessitated the need of the certificate, and second, the bench strength is less than what it needs to be to overturn the decision.

Thus, the legal scenario post the Anvar P.V.[20] case seems quite incoherent to some extent but also welcoming as it widens the door for the admissibility of electronic evidence and brings down the threshold of the authenticity of the same, though with a caveat of scepticism attached to it regarding the proper implementation of this procedure, which cannot be done away with.

Conclusion

This seems quite obvious seeing the trend in which the court has expanded the ambit of the rule for the admissibility of the electronic evidence, that the court’s only motive is to impart justice in the best way possible so that none of the person could be denied of its right to justice. Also, this is not done blindly.

As seen from the development of the jurisprudence in the Indian scenario, there are a plethora of issues which revolve around the electronic evidence, such as the probability of it getting manipulated or the question of its genuineness. In such cases, the court had initially let the allowed the admission of the electronic evidence without much hassle and procedural safeguards. But subsequent to the increasing usage of technology, and framing of the IT Act, there was an amendment brought into the Act. The court interpreted this amendment in a strict sense in order to not let the justice delivered to the wrong person.

It should always be remembered that the Act is applicable to civil as well as criminal matter in a non-bias manner. The evidence adduced does not ascertain the validity of the information in any manner. The burden of proof lies on the accused and on the person who is adducing the evidence, regarding the fact that how valid is the content of the evidence procured.

Over the years, the court has raised the bar for admissibility of electronic evidence in a gradual manner. The requirement of the certificate was made mandatory, and the adherence to the requirements enlisted under the provision of section 65B was necessitated for an electronic evidence to be made admissible. This has been a step much appreciated as this prevents the abuse of the concept of the electronic evidence. The reason for this is also to safeguard the interest of any single innocent person, as it would be extremely unjust if any innocent person is denied justice due to the admissibility of flawed evidence.

The judgments by Supreme Court have made the rule a stricter one over the years and have well delineated the jurisprudence in this arena for the welfare of all. It cannot be alleged that the apex court did not consider the daily scenario which a common mass might face in such regards. The most recent case of Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh[21], is an example par excellence for this. The court relaxed the requirement of the certificate in certain scenario where a common man might just be unable to adduce it due to the absence of possession of the device. At the same time, this case also elucidates that the court itself is not certain regarding the usage and implementation of the procedure, as has been mentioned already. Therefore, the trend over the years, according to the pronouncements and interpretation of the provisions related to the admissibility of the electronic evidence has been pretty relaxed yet a strict one. The Courts have always been inclined towards incorporating the needs of changing time and technology along with the need of the people, for justice dissemination.

[1] Ankur Chawla v. CBI, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 6461.

[2] Jagdeo Singh v. State, Crl. A. Nos. 527, 529 and 607 of 2014.

[3] Sanjaysinh Ramrao v. D.G.Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123.

[4] Arnav P.V. v. P.K.Basheer, AIR 2015 SC 180.

[5] Id.

[6] Preeti Jain v. Kunal Jain, AIR 2016 Raj 153.

[7] Paras Jain v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 2 RLW 945 (Raj).

[8] Kundan Singh v. State, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13647.

[9] Supra 27.

[10] Supra 28.

[11] Supra 24.

[12] Bala Saheb Gurling Todkari v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 3360.

[13] Supra 21.

[14] Supra 23.

[15] Thomas Bruno v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 178.

[16] Supra 14.

[17] Supra 24.

[18] Supra 24.

[19] Shafhi Mohammad v. state of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860.

[20] Supra 24.

[21] Id.


ABOUT THE WRITER

Shivam Sharan

IMG_20180605_102806_156

Shivam Sharan is a third-year law student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Although he has no particular area of interests as such in the legal field, but he likes to keep experimenting with new things and is open to edification by way of exploration. Apart from his work, he likes painting and listening to music.

Posted in Cyber Law, Law of Evidence

Admissibility of Electronic Evidence – Part II (Case laws review & analysis of trend set by judicial pronouncements)

This post constitutes the second part of a three-post-series blog post dealing with the courtroom trend with respect to the development of jurisprudence with regard to the admissibility of electronic evidence.

This post (the second part) deals with the initial development of the jurisprudence on the admissibility of electronic evidence and pre-Anvar P.V. status. The first part dealt with the background and the problems with the admissibility of the electronic evidence where the author has given an account of the manifestation of the provision in brevity. The third part shall deal with the post-Anvar P.V. status of the provision and the current scenario and conclusion of the series.

One can trace the advent of the admissibility of electronic evidence and the surrounding debate from the case of, Som Prakash v. Sate of Delhi[1], where the Supreme Court of India observed the need of statutory change to include the electronic evidence. The court insinuated that denying such discoveries to be admitted in the court of law is crude and that a statutory change could help criminal trials.

10. It is but meet that science-oriented detection of crime is made a massive programme of police work, for in our technological age nothing more primitive can be conceived of than denying the discoveries of the sciences as aids to crime suppression and nothing cruder can retard forensic efficiency than swearing by traditional oral evidence only thereby discouraging the liberal use of scientific research to prove guilt.[2]

Later on, in the case of SIL Import v. Exim Aides Exporters[3], the apex court again promoted and encouraged the use of technology, by saying that when parliament is considering the advancement in technology while framing the laws then the courts in the country should not condone the usage of the same. And information from it should be included.

15. Facsimile (or fax) is a way of sending handwritten or printed or typed material as well as pictures by wire or radio. In the West such mode of transmission came to wide use even way back in the late 1930s. By 1954 the International News Service began to use facsimile quite extensively. Technological advancement like facsimile, internet, e-mail etc. were in swift progress even before the Bill for the Amendment Act was discussed by Parliament. So when Parliament contemplated notice in writing to be given we cannot overlook the fact that Parliament was aware of modern devices and equipment already in vogue.[4]

These cases established a threshold of admissibility of electronic evidences to the courtroom. This was further substantiated in Grid Corporation of Orissa v. AES Corporation[5], the issue involved two arbitrators who had to sit together in order to appoint a third arbitrator. The court said that it is not necessary to meet the people in person, when it could be done through electronic means.

23. enience of the parties and also saves them from avoidable expenditure. When an effective consultation can be achieved by resort to electronic media and remote conferencing it is not necessary that the two persons required to act in consultation with each other must necessarily sit together at one place unless it is the requirement of law or of the ruling contract between the parties. The appointment need not necessarily be by a writing signed by the two arbitrators; it satisfies the requirement of law if the appointment (i) has been actually made, (ii) is preceded by such consultation as to amount to appointment by the two, and (iii) is communicated. It is not essential to the validity of the appointment that the parties should be consulted, or involved in the process of appointment or given a previous notice of the proposed appointment.[6]

Pre Anwar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer state

The very first instance of the case which required the admissibility of electronic evidence emerged in the case of, State v. Mohd. Afzal and Ors.[7]. This case is also referred to as the parliament attack case and was further decided by the Supreme Court. The Delhi High Court, in this case, pronounced that, the data and information which are produced by a computer can be treated as electronic evidence and should be admitted. The only pre-requisite for the admissibility is that the evidence of this sort should adhere to the checklist provided in the provisions mentioned under section 65B of the Act.

In 2005, the Supreme Court had to decide upon the requirement of the certificate as mentioned under section 65B of the Act, for adducing the evidence. This was in the case of State v. Navjot Sandhu[8], where the court said, that the phone records can be admitted. In this case, the court did not consider the need for a certificate. It just said that the call records can be admitted as secondary evidence, under sections 63 and 65 of the Act. The provision for the requirement of a certificate is mentioned under section 65B. Further, the court said that if the certificate is not being provided, then also the evidence could be put forth in the court if it is a legitimate one and fulfils the requirements given under the section 63 and section 65.

150. According to Section 63, secondary evidence means and includes, among other things, “copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies”. Section 65 enables secondary evidence of the contents of a document to be adduced if the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable. It is not in dispute that the information contained in the call records is stored in huge servers which cannot be easily moved and produced in the court. That is what the High Court has also observed at para 276. Hence, printouts taken from the computers/servers by mechanical process and certified by a responsible official of the service-providing company can be led in evidence through a witness who can identify the signatures of the certifying officer or otherwise speak of the facts based on his personal knowledge. Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65-B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.[9]

In Rakesh Kumar v. State[10], the Delhi High Court affirmed with the abovementioned decision of the apex court regarding the adducing of the call records as secondary evidence.

In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai[11], the court while turning the decision of the high court, allowed the witness to give the statement through video conferencing, and also spawned the advantages of the mode as follows:

20. Recording of evidence by video-conferencing also satisfies the object of providing, in Section 273, that evidence be recorded in the presence of the accused. The accused and his pleader can see the witness as clearly as if the witness was actually sitting before them. In fact the accused may be able to see the witness better than he may have been able to if he was sitting in the dock in a crowded courtroom. They can observe his or her demeanour. In fact the facility to playback would enable better observation of demeanour. They can hear and rehear the deposition of the witness. The accused would be able to instruct his pleader immediately and thus cross-examination of the witness is as effective, if not better. The facility of playback would give an added advantage whilst cross-examining the witness. The witness can be confronted with documents or other material or statement in the same manner as if he/she was in court. All these objects would be fully met when evidence is recorded by video-conferencing. Thus no prejudice, of whatsoever nature, is caused to the accused. Of course, as set out hereinafter, evidence by video-conferencing has to be on some conditions[12]

The case of Avnish Bajaj v. State[13], was the case where the court had to look upon the question that what differences exist between ISP and CP. It did highlight that the police needs to be abreast with the changing times and that they need to get edified about the same. At the end, the court propounded that as the ISP was the accused in this case, therefore, the burden lies upon the ISP to provide the proof of its allegations and innocence.

In Abdul Rahman Kunji v. The State of West Bengal[14], the Calcutta High Court was deciding upon the admissibility of an email as electronic evidence. The court said that the witness’ statement could be admitted to ascertain the genuineness of the copy of the email as an evidence.

Therefore, we see that the court did not necessitate the requirement of the certificate until this stage and the admissibility of the electronic evidence was not contingent upon the certificate proving the authenticity of the evidence.

[1] Som Prakash v. State of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 989.

[2] Id.

[3] SIL Import v. Exim Aides Exporters, (1999) 4 SCC 567.

[4] Id.

[5] Grid Corpn. of Orissa ltd. v. AES Corpn., 2002 AIR (SC) 3435.

[6] Id.

[7] State v. Mohd. Afzal & Ors., (2003) DLT 385.

[8] State v. Navjot Sandhu, AIR 2005 SC 3820.

[9] Id.

[10] Rakesh Kumar v. State, (2009) 163 DLT 658.

[11] State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai, (2003) 4 SCC 601.

[12] Id.

[13] Avnish Bajaj v. State, 2008 (105) DRJ 721.

[14] Abdul Rahman Kunji v. The State of West Bengal, (2015) 1 Cal LT 318.


ABOUT THE WRITER

Shivam Sharan

IMG_20180605_102806_156

Shivam Sharan is a third-year law student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Although he has no particular area of interests as such in the legal field, but he likes to keep experimenting with new things and is open to edification by way of exploration. Apart from his work, he likes painting and listening to music.

Posted in Cyber Law, Law of Evidence

Admissibility of Electronic Evidence – Part I (The Progress and Vision)

This post constitutes the first part of a three-post-series blog post dealing with the courtroom trend with respect to the development of jurisprudence with regard to the admissibility of electronic evidence.

This post (the first part) deals with the background and the problems with the admissibility of the electronic evidence where the author has given an account of the manifestation of the provision in brevity. The second part shall deal with the initial development of the jurisprudence on the admissibility of electronic evidence and pre-Anvar P.V. status. The third part shall deal with the post-Anvar P.V. status of the provision and the current scenario and conclusion of the series. 

The Evidence Act, 1872[1] (hereinafter, the Act), is said to be one of the brilliant pieces of legislation drafted during the colonial era, and which is still being followed. The brilliance could be elucidated by the fact that there have not been a lot of amendments proposed to this act since the time it was framed. One of the major amendments that were brought into the Act was the inclusion of the provision dealing with the admissibility of electronic evidence.

Being a party to the UNCITRAL, India was obligated to frame a law which could govern the actions undertaken in the arena of information technology. This gave way for the framing of the Information Technology Act[2] (hereinafter, the IT Act), in the year 2000. The advent of this act legitimately governed the transactions through the internet and other acts undertaken through the electronic medium. This set the path for the use of the electronic records as evidence to prove the factum probanda. In order to accommodate such a requirement, the amendment of the Act was necessary. This amendment manifested as a provision regarding the inclusion and admissibility of electronic evidence.

Section 64[3] of the Act limits itself to the primary evidence, whereas; section 65[4] deals with secondary evidence. The adduced evidence which does not get categorized under the ambit of section 64 inevitably falls into the ambit of section 65. In the case of secondary evidences, the burden of proof lies on the party putting forth the secondary evidence. The amendments brought forth were under section 65, as, section 65A[5] and section 65B[6]. Section 65A concerned itself with the admissibility of those electronic evidences which fulfill the criteria mentioned under section 65B. Therefore, in order to adduce the electronic evidence, it should satisfy the requirements mentioned under section 65B. This work primarily will be shedding light on this very development to an extent. The work will majorly deal with the analysis of the trend in which the courts have developed the jurisprudence, with respect to the rules regarding electronic evidence. The pronouncement of some of the major cases has been taken into account and the change in course of decision by the courts will be studied.

Issues with Admissibility of Electronic Evidence

The debate around the admissibility of electronic evidence exists for a long time now, especially due to a plethora of reasons associated to the genuineness and authenticity of the evidence so provided. Some of the issues related to the same are given below:

  1. One of the most clichéd issues is that there might be a possibility of alteration or manipulation done to the evidence between the date it came into being and the date it was produced before the court. This also forces an individual to reflect upon the fact that how much one can trust and rely upon the software or the algorithm responsible for the production of the data created.
  2. Since electronic devices are prone to the threat of being hacked unethically, this casts upon a question on the nexus between the document so produced as evidence and the person responsible for the creation of such document.
  3. The world today seems connected by virtue of virtual platforms of the likes of Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram etc. where finding the origin of the information could be difficult, and hence, relying on information extracted from such platforms also seems problematic.
  4. Considering the aforementioned, it might also be difficult to prove that who all had access to the device which created the information/data. There have been a large number of instances where people who executed a command in a device were not the actual users of the same. This problem is also faced in computers connected to Local Area Network (LAN).
  5. Tracking down the data through the internet has become complicated especially after the advent of the technology of cloud computing, as extracting such data might entail an obligation to follow contractual terms which will then be followed by taking proper permissions from courts of different jurisdictions.
  6. Another issue might emerge regarding the time when the data was created, as websites usually are seen to be updated constantly. This could pose a procedural as well as a substantive difficulty.
  7. Social media platforms have been facing the problem of fake information since its advent. Ascertaining the authenticity of the information and the place of origin is another huge problem which is faced in this law.
  8. Admissibility of electronic evidence is also said to be responsible for diminishing the line of difference between the primary evidence and the secondary evidence. This is because the statute has opened the gate for the inclusion of a large number of evidences associated with the electronic medium to be considered as primary evidence. This is especially because of the fact that most of the data produced by the electronic devices are not in the tangible form. Now, considering the same, it might be a brilliant contention of treating a printout of a word document as secondary evidence when the word document itself is a primary one. But then, we need to understand that the production of the primary evidence becomes impossible in case of electronic evidence.
  9. Though it is now an established conjecture that after the acceptance of electronic evidence, it has become comparatively easier to punish the perpetrators of terror attacks, due to the fact that they themselves resort to the use of advanced technology. But, it cannot be denied that such evidences are too prone to manipulation. Evidence tampering is an issue which is being faced since time immemorial, and it is even easier to introduce this when it comes to electronic evidence. Albeit the fact that the cyber forensics has come up with advanced algorithm to find out the possible tampers with evidences, but still, the area lies in the grey zone and is debatable.
  10. It is pretty obvious that the usage of electronic devices is increasing day by day. If a positivist approach is adhered to, then it might result in a possible opening of a floodgate for the admission of all sorts of electronic data as evidence. It is another debatable issue that to what extent does the ambit needs to be relaxed in case of admissibility of electronic evidence.

[1] The Indian Evidence Act of 1872.

[2] The Information Technology Act of 2000.

[3] Supra 1, section 64.

[4] Supra 1, section 65.

[5] Supra 1, section 65A.

[6] Supra 1, section 65B.


ABOUT THE WRITER

Shivam Sharan

IMG_20180605_102806_156

Shivam Sharan is a third-year law student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Although he has no particular area of interests as such in the legal field, but he likes to keep experimenting with new things and is open to edification by way of exploration. Apart from his work, he likes painting and listening to music.

Posted in Right to Privacy

Right to be Forgotten: A Forgotten Part of Right to Privacy

Right to privacy is a fundamental right and not merely a common man right. The ambit of the right to life embodied in Art.21 is wide and far reaching[1]. The right to life has been liberally interpreted so as to mean something more than mere survival and mere existence. It, therefore, includes all those aspects of life which go to make man’s life meaningful, complete and worth living.[2] To make one’s life meaningful and complete right to privacy is a core aspect of life.

Right to be forgotten is a part of privacy that needs to be provided for every individual for protecting his sensitive private and personal information. The availability of a plethora of information sometimes becomes inconsistent with the desire for privacy. There may be instances, where information that one wishes to hide from the public domain, is available freely online. To imbibe the concept of a dignified life guaranteed by Art.21 right to be forgotten need to be considered as a facet of right to privacy thus a fundamental right.

POSITION IN US AND UK REGARDING RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN

The concept of the right to be forgotten had originated from the much older droit à l’oubli (right to oblivion) that has historically been applied in exceptional cases involving an individual who has served a criminal sentence and wishes to no longer be associated with the criminal actions.

The right to be forgotten has been recognised as a part of the right to privacy in countries like UK and US. But in both the countries this right is not regarded as an absolute one and it needs to be balanced with the right to freedom of speech and expression and right to information. In May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘Court’) recognized the right to be forgotten as a part of the fundamental right to privacy in the case of Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González[3].  Similarly in US in the case of Melvin v. Reid[4], the court recognised right to be forgotten as a part of right to privacy and reasoned that “any person living a life of rectitude has that right to happiness which includes a freedom from unnecessary attacks on his character, social standing or reputation”.

VIEW OF INDIAN HIGH COURTS ON RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN

The Karnataka High Court in the case of Sri Vasunathan v. Registrar General[5], upheld a women’s right to be forgotten and Justice Bypareddy had observed that “This is in line with the trend in western countries of the ‘right to be forgotten’ in sensitive cases involving women in general and highly sensitive cases involving rape or affecting the modesty and reputation of the person concerned.”

The Kerala High Court had also recognised the right to be forgotten as a part of the right to privacy[6]. In this case, a writ petition was filed for protection of the right to privacy under Art.21 of the constitution and petitioner was seeking directions from the court for the removal of the name and personal information of the rape victim from the search engines in order to protect her identity. The court held in favour of the petitioners recognising the right to be forgotten and issued an interim order directing the search engine to remove the name of the petitioner from orders posted on its website until further orders were issued.

The famous privacy judgment is also highly significant also for the holding on the right to be forgotten. The concurrent judgment delivered by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul affirmed and identified the right to be forgotten, in physical and virtual spaces such as the internet, under the umbrella of informational privacy. The right to be forgotten puts individual in control of the information they put and seek out to the erasure of data concerning them[7].

CONCLUSION

Art 21 is an ever expanding and the list of rights under its ambit is not exhaustive. Right to be forgotten too is such a right, which comes under the preview of the right to privacy. Though the right to be forgotten can be termed as a narrow right, it is obvious that this right must be protected in all sensitive cases and in issues of informational privacy to protect the true object of holding the right to privacy as a fundamental right.

[1] Indian Constitutional Law, M.P.Jain 6th edition, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur

[2] ibid

[3] Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Espa ˜nola de Protecci ´on de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja Gonz ´alez, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:317

[4] Cal.App. 285, 297 P.91 (1931)

[5] Petition No.62038 of 2016, Karnataka HC

[6] Sredharan T v. State Of Kerala,Civil Writ Petition No. 9478 of 2016

[7] Justice K.S Puttaswamy v Union of India


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sowjanya S

photo-37288_960_720

Miss Sowjanya S is a third-year law student at School of law, Sastra deemed to be University, Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu where she is pursuing B.com LL.B.(Hons). She hails from Chennai where she had also completed her schooling. Research had always been a fascinating work for her.  She is a hardworking smart student who always has the curiosity to learn. She loves to brainstorm problems and find effective solutions.

Posted in Environmental Law

Dereliction of Public Consent in EIA: The Sterlite Plant Controversy

On 22nd May 2018, Thoothukudi (Tuticorin) in the Tamil Nadu state of India, turned violent when protest demanding the closure of Vedanta’s Sterlite Copper unit entered in a clash between the protestors and the police, killing 11 people. These protests began nearly two decades ago intensifying after the company announced its expansion. A stay was put on the expansion insisting that the company should seek public consultation first. However, the plant got an environmental clearance in 1995 without even conducting the mandatory EIA. Moreover, Sterlite, which falls under the Hazardous Red Category large industry, in order to avoid a public hearing, claimed that its new project site fell within the SIPCOT Industrial Complex which is exempted under the EIA notification. These events have brought in limelight the loopholes in public consultation under EIA in India.

Today, when the nature of sustainability has gone complex and multi-pronged, it is suggested that no single institution can be expected to hold all expertise knowledge for decision-making. In International Law, public participation was introduced by Aarhus Convention, 1988. The Convention is a legally consolidated measure to enhance public participation in decision making and access to justice. There are other instruments like Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment (Art 16) and North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Arts 13–14) which contains public participation clauses, thus highlighting the importance of public participation.

Indian Constitution is one of the few constitutions of the world which acts as grund norm for national environment law. The Constitution under Part III guarantees fundamental rights which are essential for the development of every individual and to which a person is inherently entitled by virtue of being human alone. The right to live in a healthy environment as part of Article 21 was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra vs. State.

In India, EIA is the only environmental tool which legally ensures that any new project be installed in a way that is not detrimental to the environment. In 1994, an EIA notification made Environmental Clearance (EC) mandatory for any expansion or modernization activity or for setting up new projects listed in Schedule 1 of the notification. This was followed by an EIA notification, 2006  which elaborates EIA as a multi-step process where a proposed project has to undergo: Screening, Scoping, Public Consultation and Appraisal. Subsequently, an Expert Appraisal Committee undertakes a detailed scrutiny of the documents on the basis of which the concerned Ministry issues its final decision. In India, the foundation for public participation in EIA was laid down in a 1988 conference titled the International Conference on Environmental Impact Analysis for the Developing Countries held in New Delhi. Interestingly, despite considerable debate centred on the role of public participation, there was no representation at the conference from public interest groups themselves. This would gradually become the norm, as the public interest was simply understood to be represented through the roles of various others – especially funding agencies and the government.

pIC

Specifically, the element of public consultation has been a failure in India due to:

  1. Firstly, easy ways by project proponents to exempt themselves from holding public consultations. For instance in projects of Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., New Delhi and the Commonwealth Games Village over river Yamuna in New Delhi, India.
  2. Secondly, evasive nature of its proceedings. For instance, improper method of voting at Nuclear Power Plant of NPCIL at Gorakhpur, Haryana or violence during public hearings of Jindal Group’s Coal mines.

EIAs have eventually become a ritualistic farce in each country in addition to governmental prejudice against environmental activists. The process is weakened by the prioritization of infrastructure development, a focus on mitigation measures rather than prevention of harm, lack of accountability, a general disrespect of local people’s perspectives (especially in rural, traditional and poor areas)  and bias of some environmental impact statements (EISs). Moreover, most EISs hardly provide any useful data to decision makers thereby failing to adopt standard scientific methods.

Any developmental activity, especially mega projects like Sterlite have a consequential and associated impact of a greater magnitude on both the environment and human life. It thus becomes imperative to make EIAs more objective and verifiable, such that all information related to a proposed project must be open to the public ensuing public hearings. Being a systematic process, it should ensure that public consultations take place in the early stages of planning and design in order to eliminate any potential problems that might be a hindrance to the goal of sustainable development.


ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Mahvish Shahab

Mahvish

Mahvish Shahab is a fifth-year law student at Jamia Millia Islamia. She has an interest in human rights law and has worked across various interdisciplinary human right issues.

Pranav Tanwar

pranav

Pranav Tanwar is a fifth-year law student at Jamia Millia Islamia, he has a keen interest in almost everything about law, sports, and people. Apart from reading and writing, he manages Indian Journal of Law and Public Policy.

 

Posted in Fundamental Rights, Marriage and family

“Restitution of Conjugal Rights OR Deprivation of Privacy Rights”?

Marriage is defined as “the civil status, condition, or relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex”[1]. Marriage is the union of a man and woman by law for mutual rights and discharge of obligations. This cluster of mutual rights is collectively called conjugal rights.

As per Hindu law, marriage is eternal, divine, and sacramental. According to the Hindu philosophy, the objectives of marriage are Dharma- righteousness, virtue and justice, Praja or Santhana – Procreation, and Rati- Pleasure. “Marriage is considered as a socio-legally sanctioned route to progeny, in obligation to ancestral debts and mandates.[2]

A positive remedy that was formulated to protect the institution of marriage by the Hindu Marriage Act is a restitution of conjugal rights. Though it was constituted a positive remedy for preserving the sanctity and affirmation, the provision does not adapt itself with changing times. Since the institution of marriage had several changes, only confusion and problems are popping out of this remedy.

The first case where this provision was declared to be unconstitutional was T. Sareetha v Venkata Subbaih[3]. In this case, the Andhra Pradesh High court had held restitution of conjugal rights as against right to privacy. This judgment was subsequently overruled in Saroj Rani[4] Case. But it should be noted that the right to privacy was not considered a fundamental right when these judgments were declared. But now the Honourable Supreme court had held that right to privacy is a fundamental right[5] under Art 21 of the constitution. Therefore, this puts the validity of the provision into question.

Article 21 states that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by Law”. This is narrated in a negative style but entrusts the positive rights of life and personal liberty. Privacy is an element of Art 21 and privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation[6]. Therefore, sexual activity without the person’s will is only making “one’s body a vehicle for the procreation of another human being”, as stated in the T. Sareetha[7] case. This leads to surrender one’s body to the domination of another is a mental torture, degrading dignity and grossly violating the right of privacy.

A right of free choice is complete autonomy to decide how one’s body is to be sensed and how it is to be used of procreation of children. Forced marital cohabitation is a major violation of the right to privacy and this should never be carried on with a legal sanction and support from legislation. “A decree of restitution of conjugal rights thus enforced offends the inviolability of the body and the mind subjected to the decree and offends the integrity of such a person and invades the marital privacy and domestic intimacies of such a person.[8]” Therefore, restitution of conjugal rights gives wide scope to degrade the integrity of one’s body and restricts the autonomy of decision making about oneself.

Marriage, procreation and sexual orientation are integral parts of the right to privacy that gets infringed because of this provision. Even the ancient Hindu law does not forcibly compel the wife to cohabit with her husband. In Bai Jiva v Narsingh Lalbhai[9] it was observed by the Bombay HC that, “Hindu law itself even while it lays down the duty of the wife of implicit obedience and return to her husband, has laid down no such sanction or procedure as compulsion by the courts to force her to return against her will”.

Restitution of conjugal rights originated in England where marriage is considered as a contract and wife is a chattel supposed to be owned and possessed by the husband. The same started having its roots in India from the case of Monshee Buzloor V Shumsoonaissa Begum[10] in 1866. But in Britain itself, this remedy was abolished in 1970. It is clear that restitution of conjugal rights is a remedy that had never existed in ancient India; it was implemented in India from England even in England this had been abolished in 1970. Moreover, this remedy infringes the fundamental right of right to privacy. Therefore, it is high time for the legislature to amend this outdated unconstitutional provision for the protection of dignity and privacy rights.

[1] Black’s law dictionary, 4th edition, 1968

[2] 71st Report of the Law Commission- the Hindu Marriage Act, para 6.5

[3] T. Sareetha v Venkata Subbaiah, AIR 1983 AP 356

[4] Saroj Rani v Sudarshan Kumar Chanda, AIR 1984 SC 1562

[5] Justice K.S Puttaswamy and others v Union of India and anr

[6] ibid

[7] Supra note 3

[8] ibid

[9] ILR 1927 Bom 264

[10] 1866-67 (11) MIA 551


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sowjanya S

photo-37288_960_720

Miss Sowjanya S is a third-year law student at School of law, Sastra deemed to be University, Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu where she is pursuing B.com LL.B.(Hons). She hails from Chennai where she had also completed her schooling. Research had always been a fascinating work for her.  She is a hardworking smart student who always has the curiosity to learn. She loves to brainstorm problems and find effective solutions.