Harini Srinivasan is a student of Batch 2027 from Campus Law Centre, having specific interest on Intellectual Property Rights and Insolvency and Bankruptcy code.
One of the emerging areas within the field of intellectual property law is the protection of personality rights. In the realm of trademark law, the protection of marks primarily serves two purposes. The first is the protection of consumers, who associate a particular name or mark with goods and services originating from a known source and of a certain quality. The second is to preserve and protect the goodwill built over time by the owner of the mark[i]. While considering the purely commercial aspect and drawing an analogy with trademark law, the recognition of personality rights may also be understood as respecting and protecting the choice of famous celebrities to promote or endorse goods or services with which they choose to associate, thereby safeguarding their goodwill and commercial reputation. At the same time, such protection prevents third parties from misleading the public by creating a false impression that a particular celebrity has endorsed a specific product or service, and from profiting through such deception. Granting personality rights, in this sense, is akin to recognising the famous persona of a celebrity as a distinctive mark. The present article examines the journey of the recognition of personality rights and the manner in which their scope has widened over time.
Genesis of personality rights
The recognition of personality rights is not something of very recent development; rather, it can be traced back to 1999–2000, when disputes concerning personality rights arose in relation to domain names. Initially, the Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process of April 30, 1991, restricted the scope of protection to only the most offensive forms of predatory practices. Accordingly, two limitations were introduced in relation to registration of domain names: one restricting the procedure to deliberate, bad-faith, abusive registrations, and the other confining abusive registrations only to trademarks and service marks. Thus, registrations that violated trade names, geographical indications, or personality rights were not considered to fall within the definition of abusive registration for the purposes of the administrative procedure[ii].
In the Interim Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process relating to the Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in the Internet Domain Name System, issued on April 12, 2001, the report addressed the right to protect one’s own identity, often referred to as a “personality right,” which focuses on an individual’s right to control the commercial use of his or her identity. This right, it was stated, serves to prohibit the unauthorised commercial use of a person’s name, likeness, or other personal characteristics closely associated with him or her[iii].
However, the Final Report of that Process dated September 3, 2001, concluded by observing that although the unauthorised registration of personal names as domain names may offend legitimate sensitivities, the UDRP does not provide a remedy for all such grievances, nor was it originally intended to do so. Consequently, persons who have gained eminence and respect, but who have not commercially exploited their reputation, are unable to avail themselves of the UDRP to protect their personal names against parasitic registrations[iv].
Hence, the registration of personal names of famous personalities, such as authors, sportspersons, and musicians, became rampant, leading to unfair commercial exploitation, whereby registrants took advantage of public confusion and obtained click-through commissions. However, some solace has been provided by panels in dealing with disputes of this nature.
As noted in Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited v. Richard Brown[v], from earlier panel decisions in Jeanette Winterson v. Mark Hogarth,[vi]; Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd[vii],Madonna Ciccone, p/k/a Madonna v. Dan Parisi and ‘Madonna.com’[viii],; and Serena Williams and Venus Williams v. Eileen White Byrne and Allgolfconsultancy,[ix], it has been well established that the Policy can protect a complainant’s unregistered rights in his or her personal name as a mark, where the name is recognized as identifying the origin of goods or services in relation to which it is used.
InAhmanson Land Company v. Save Open Space and Electronic Imaging Systems,[x] and Ahmanson Land Company v. Vince Curtis, [xi], the Panels found that trade names or marks that have, through usage, become distinctive of the users’ goods or services in commerce may be protectable as they have acquired a “secondary meaning”. In the former case, it said: “A mark comprising a personal name has acquired secondary meaning if a substantial segment of the public understands the designation, when used in connection with services or a business, not as a personal name, but as referring to a particular source or organisation.”
This test has been further refined by WIPO panels. In Chung, Mong Koo and Hyundai Motor Co. v. Individual, [xii], the Panel observed that the issue ultimately turns on whether sufficient evidence establishes a nexus between the personal name and its use and association in trade and commerce. In undertaking this assessment, the Panel suggested certain guiding factors, including: the extent to which the commercial community identifies the individual with the company; the degree to which the individual is perceived by the media and the public as the alter ego and driving force behind the enterprise; the extent of the individual’s ownership interest in the company; the degree of personal control exercised over the enterprise; the extent to which the individual is associated with the major achievements of the enterprise; and whether the individual or the company has a demonstrable commercial interest in protecting the individual’s name.
Though it has been mentioned in the Interim Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process that personality rights, unlike trademark rights, do not require the demonstration of confusion, they are considered to be infringed when the public can identify the person in question from the unauthorized commercial use of the name or identity by a third party and further noted personality rights may protect an individual who does not commercially exploit his or her own identity, but nevertheless seeks to prevent others from doing so[xiii].
However, it appears from the above discussion that, in practice, protection has generally been afforded only where the personal name has acquired recognition in trade or commerce, such as in cases involving famous personalities who have associated their identity with goods or services, or businesspersons whose personal identity has become closely identified with, or functions as the alter ego of, a commercial enterprise.
Recognition of personality rights by Indian courts
In India, courts had firstly recognized the right of publicity, which represents the commercial dimension of an individual’s personality. In Titan Industries Ltd. v. Ramkumar Jewellers, the Delhi High Court, referring to Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum[xiv], acknowledged that an individual possesses a right in the publicity value of his or her identity, including the right to grant the exclusive privilege of commercially exploiting one’s image or likeness. The Court further observed that no one is free to trade upon another’s name or appearance and claim immunity, and that infringement of the right of publicity arises when the celebrity possesses an enforceable right in his or her persona and the celebrity is identifiable from the defendant’s unauthorised use.
Hence, it is not necessary that a section of the public must identify a celebrity with a particular product or service. Even where a famous personality chooses not to commercialise or publicise his or her image, such a choice, being within the sole control and discretion of the individual, is nevertheless entitled to legal protection, preventing third parties from commercially exploiting the celebrity’s identity without authorization. The right of publicity ensures that the use of a celebrity’s name, image, or other attributes of identity for the endorsement or promotion of goods and services remains subject to the celebrity’s consent. Such protection not only safeguards the commercial value and goodwill associated with the celebrity’s persona but also protects consumers from being misled into believing that a particular celebrity has endorsed or is associated with a product or service when no such endorsement exists
Similarly, in ICC Development (International) Ltd. v. Arvee Enterprises, [xv], it was held that the right of publicity has evolved from the right of privacy and can inhere only in an individual or in the indicia of an individual’s personality, such as name, personality traits, signature, or voice. The Delhi High Court further clarified that the right of publicity vests in the individual alone, and that the individual is entitled to commercially exploit and protect such persona from unauthorised use.
It was observed by the High Court of Madras in Shivaji Rao Gaikwad v. Varsha Productions[xvi], that although personality rights are not statutorily recognised in India, courts have nevertheless acknowledged such rights through the doctrine of the right of publicity. The Court further opined that personality rights vest in those persons who have attained the status of a celebrity. The question of who constitutes a celebrity was answered in Titan Industries Ltd. v. Ramkumar Jewellers[xvii], wherein the Court observed that a celebrity is defined as a famous or well-known person, that is, a person about whom many people talk or whom many people know and further as observed by the Delhi High court in D.M. Entertainment (P) Ltd. v. Baby Gift House[xviii], status of a celebrity inherently grants the plaintiff proprietary rights over his personality and the various attributes associated with it.
Conclusion
It must be noted that rapid technological advancement and the widespread reliance on e-commerce platforms have significantly increased instances of the unauthorised exploitation of personality rights. The emergence of AI-enabled technologies, such as deepfakes, face morphing, voice cloning, generative artificial intelligence, and machine learning, has further aggravated the problem. Through these technologies, unknown persons may engage in the unauthorised use, reproduction, imitation, or misappropriation of a celebrity’s identity or personality attributes, including their name, likeness, image, or voice. Such misuse may occur through counterfeit merchandise, deceptive endorsements, or AI-generated synthetic media, which may falsely suggest endorsement, sponsorship, affiliation, or approval by the concerned individual. These practices not only cause irreparable harm to the celebrity’s goodwill, reputation, and contractual or statutory rights but may also infringe the individual’s right to live with dignity, particularly where such technologies are deliberately used to defame or malign the personality concerned.
In several cases, courts have granted protection against the unauthorised use of a celebrity’s personal name (or the name by which the individual is commonly known in the industry), image, likeness, or voice, particularly where such attributes are distinctively associated with the individual and are sought to be exploited for commercial or personal gain without authorisation.
The courts have also accorded considerable weight to dignity-related concerns and the protection of individual privacy, particularly in situations where AI-generated technologies, such as deepfakes, are deployed in ways that diminish a celebrity’s standing or expose an individual to public disrepute. While the jurisprudence surrounding personality rights has traditionally been anchored in the protection of commercial interests against unauthorised exploitation, judicial reasoning reflects a gradual but discernible shift whereby the preservation of dignity and privacy has emerged as an additional, and in appropriate cases, a determinative consideration. This is especially so where synthetic or manipulated content is of a defamatory character, directly implicating the right to live with dignity under Article 21. At the same time, in instances where AI-generated content prima facie encroaches upon privacy or particularly where it tends to erode the individual’s reputation in the public domain, courts have, with measured emphasis, indicated that recourse may appropriately be first sought under the remedial framework contemplated by the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. For instance, in Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan v. The Artists Planet & Ors[xix]., the Court observed that individuals aggrieved by unauthorised online content should ordinarily avail the statutory grievance redressal mechanism provided under the IT Intermediary Rules, which requires the Grievance Officer of the concerned platform to take action within twenty-four hours of receiving a complaint. The Court noted that approaching the courts directly without invoking this statutory mechanism may defeat the objective of the rules, which were designed to provide an efficient, cost-effective, and time-sensitive remedy while also reducing the burden on the judiciary. Nevertheless, the grant of such protection is typically accompanied by an ad-interim ex- parte injunction, which requires the plaintiff i.e. the celebrity to establish a prima facie case of unauthorized exploitation of personality attributes, demonstrate that the balance of convenience lies in his or her favour, and show that irreparable harm or injury would be caused if such an injunction is not granted, particularly where the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s identity may cause lasting damage to reputation, goodwill, and commercial interests. At the same time, courts have cautioned that the enforcement of personality rights must be balanced with the right to freedom of expression. For instance, while granting protection in cases involving prominent personalities such as Kamal Haasan, courts have expressly clarified that such protection does not extend to legitimate forms of expression such as satire, parody, caricature, or lampooning. Similarly, the Delhi High Court, while granting personality rights to Baba Ramdev, arguments were also advanced that the impugned content fell within the recognised exceptions of parody, caricature, or lampooning; however, the onus remained on the concerned party to demonstrate that the content genuinely qualified for such protection[xx].
[i] Israel Harold Asper v. Communication X Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0540 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr. 2001).
[ii] Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Richard Brown, WIPO Case No. D2008-0384 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr. 2008).
[iii] Id
[iv] Id
[v] Id
[vi]Jeanette Winterson v. Mark Hogarth, WIPO Case No. D2000-0235 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr. 2000).
[vii] Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr. 2000).
[viii] Madonna Ciccone p/k/a Madonna v. Dan Parisi & “Madonna.com”, WIPO Case No. D2000-0847 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr. 2000).
[ix] Serena Williams & Venus Williams v. Eileen White Byrne & Allgolfconsultancy, WIPO Case No. D2000-1673 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr. 2000).
[x] Ahmanson Land Co. v. Save Open Space & Electronic Imaging Systems, WIPO Case No. D2000-0858 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr. 2000).
[xi] Ahmanson Land Co. v. Vince Curtis, WIPO Case No. D2000-0859 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr. 2000).
[xii] Chung Mong Koo & Hyundai Motor Co. v. Individual, WIPO Case No. D2005-1068 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation Ctr. 2005).
[xiii] Asper v. Communication X Inc., supra note 1.
[xiv] Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
[xv] ICC Dev. (Int’l) Ltd. v. Arvee Enters., (2003) 26 PTC 245 (Del).
[xvi] Shivaji Rao Gaikwad v. Varsha Prods., 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 158 (Mad).
[xvii] Titan Indus. Ltd. v. Ramkumar Jewellers, supra note 15.
[xviii] D M Entertainment (P) Ltd v Baby Gift House 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4790.
[xix] Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan v. The Artists Planet & Ors., (Del. High Ct. Nov. 27, 2025).
[xx] Swami Ramdev v. John Doe(s) & Ors., 2026 LiveLaw (Del) 231 (Del.).
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