When Judicial Oversight Overshadows the Gram Sabha: The Forest Rights Question

Nisha Verma is a graduate from Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow, and currently a practicing Advocate in Delhi. She has a keen interest in contemporary legal developments and emerging issues at the intersection of law, governance, and public policy.

On 6 November, a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta issued directions governing eligibility under the Forest Rights Act, 2006, in the Megamalai hills of Tamil Nadu. In A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, the court held that people who cultivate forest land but live there only temporarily, or live outside the forest boundary, cannot qualify as forest dwellers on the basis of such cultivation alone. The State’s figures counted 1,595 cultivators who live permanently in the forest, 232 with temporary residence, and 2,767 outside the boundary. The last two groups were directed to be excluded from consideration under the Act.

A Special Committee has been formed with former Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai as Chairman, supported by an Officer of the Central Empowered Committee and the Tamil Nadu Principal Chief Conservator of Forests. This committee shall review orders passed under the Act, oversee the adjudication of claims through various directions issued to the authorities and shall report to the Court in a sealed cover. Tamil Nadu shall constitute the remaining Gram Sabhas within the stipulated period of 30 days and shall complete the claims within 5 months from then. Tamil Nadu shall submit monthly reports and pay the Chairman ₹25 lakh in 4 instalments. The case is listed for hearing on 01st February 2027.

Excluding commercial cultivators who live elsewhere is not hard to defend. Section 2(c) protects Scheduled Tribes who primarily reside in and depend on forests for livelihood. Section 2(o) requires other traditional forest dwellers to establish three generations, or 75 years, of primary residence and dependence before 13 December 2005. Merely planning to cultivate silk cottons, with or without backing from commercial interests, cannot provide proof of either of these statuses. However, whilst reading this section, it should be noted that section 3(1)(c) refers to “minor forest produce” traditionally gathered within or outside the village, and so the individual is not completely alien to all rights contained within the statute. More directly, a Ministry of Tribal Affairs clarification dated 9 June 2008 explains that the word “primarily” can include persons whose dwelling houses are outside forest land but who have habitation or patches for self-cultivation there and spend most of their time in temporary structures or working on those patches. This clarification does not mean that all external cultivators are entitled to claim rights but shows that mere residence outside the boundary is not a safe ground for disqualification. While other states may use this as a higher principle it may not be supported by the facts in Megamalai as there was intention for commercial cultivation.

The Court also expressed concerns about the tiger reserve. There were 4601 encroachers on more than 5000 hectares recorded by the Court’s order on 29th May 2026 in the same case. The Act seeks to balance the conservation needs with the rights of those entitled. Section 4(5) prevents eviction until recognition and verification has been completed. Section 4(2) states that if the area is notified as a critical wildlife habitat the rights can only be amended or the persons relocated once the statutory requirements have been fulfilled. This includes proving that co-existence is not possible, a relocation package and informed written consent of the Gram Sabha. A critical tiger habitat and a critical wildlife habitat are distinct statutory designations; Section 4(2) should not be assumed to apply merely because an area is a tiger reserve. But the general protection under Section 4(5) remains important. The Court’s direction excluding nearly three thousand people on the basis of the State’s categories, before their individual claims pass through Gram Sabha verification, risks removing them from that protection at once.

Parliament put the decision at the bottom. Under Section 6(1), the Gram Sabha receives claims, verifies them, draws a map and passes a resolution. Appeals lie to the Sub-Divisional Level Committee under Section 6(2), and then to the District Level Committee under Section 6(4), whose decision Section 6(6) makes final and binding. Section 6(7) provides for a State Level Monitoring Committee to monitor the process. The design assumes that the village knows who lives off which land.

The Supreme Court once agreed. In Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment and Forests (2013), the case Kennedy relies on, the Court did not decide the Dongria Kondh’s religious and cultural claims over the Niyamgiri hills itself. It sent them to the Gram Sabhas with a three-month deadline and insisted that the meetings be free of pressure from the State and the mining company. Twelve Gram Sabhas met between July and August 2013, and all rejected the project.

Kennedy keeps the vocabulary and changes the structure. Whilst the Court says that decisions should be made with strict regard to Section 6 and not in relation to current occupation status, it also creates an authority above the district committee whose advice binds the authorities and whose report will be sent to the Court in a sealed envelope. It does not specify whether the committee can overturn the decision, which could create a fourth level within Parliament that can override the statute’s final decision. This cannot be done under Article 142, as the Court cannot override explicit provisions of statutes (Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, 1998). If the committee does not have the power to overturn decisions, then their advice is not binding, and the process is more of a comfort to the Court than it gives the claimants any right. If a claimant has lost their challenge under section 6(2) or 6(4), no further statutory remedy is available, and they must seek judicial review.

The sealed cover compounds the problem. In Madhyamam Broadcasting v. Union of India (2023), the Court held that the sealed-cover procedure offends natural justice and open justice because the affected party cannot see or respond to what the judge reads. It said the procedure should not be used where a less restrictive means exists and offered public-interest immunity proceedings, with redactions and summaries, as the alternative. That case turned on national security. Kennedy identifies no comparable secret or explains why the report cannot be disclosed to affected claimants. In March 2023, Chief Justice Chandrachud refused a sealed note in the One Rank One Pension case, asking what could be secret in implementing the Court’s own orders. The committee will review decisions of public bodies about public rights, and most of the people affected are not before the Court. Even earlier, in March 2022, Chief Justice Ramana said he did not want sealed covers.

There is a case for the Court’s intervention. Tamil Nadu had not formed Gram Sabhas when the Court first took up the encroachments, and the bench noted that the State woke up late. The State told the Court that implementation of the Act had stalled due to an interim order of the Madras High Court, which the Supreme Court vacated in 2016. About 40 Gram Sabhas now exist, and about 1,600 claims have come in. The Court has seen what happens when it trusts the paper record. In February 2019, in Wildlife First v. Ministry of Forest and Environment, it ordered the eviction of everyone whose claims had been rejected, then stayed its own order within a fortnight and asked the States to show that the rejections followed due process. A former Chief Justice reading the orders is, in a sense, the check that was missing in 2019.

The tool the Court is using is the continuing mandamus it has run in forest cases since T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, with the Central Empowered Committee, a body set up on its direction in 2002, as its eyes. That machinery was built to police the State’s compliance with forest conservation law. Pointing it at a statute whose purpose is to recognise rights, and whose decisions belong to Gram Sabhas, turns it around. The Court may supervise formation of Gram Sabhas and compliance with deadlines. Supervising what they decide is different.

The State requested a retired judge-led committee, and the order records that the Special Committee was constituted at its request. It does not say that the State selected the individual members. The panel’s make-up nevertheless raises questions. It has a retired Chief Justice, an officer of the Court’s own forest body and the head of the State forest force. Statutory Committees under section 6(8) have representatives from Tribal Affairs Department and Panchayati Raj Institutions including members from Scheduled Tribes and at least one woman. This is not reflected in the Special Committee. In the Adani-Hindenburg matter, the Court refused to take names from the government in a sealed cover, saying an expert committee must command public confidence. The Court can retain its supervision. Most of the issues can be rectified prior to the February hearing. The Court can make it clear that whilst the Committee has the power to refer back to an authority with reasons, the finality of section 6(6) and statutory appeals will remain. The Court can ensure that a redacted version for the Gram Sabhas and claimants can be provided. A member can also be appointed to represent Tribal Welfare or the Community. None of this slows the five-month timetable, and all of it fits within the order the Court has already made.

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